SERA - ShakeMap

April 14 2022 John Eidinger ©G&E Engineering Systems Inc. 2022

Notice: this presentation is not endorsed by EPRI, the USGS, any Utility or any Manufacturer.

No warranty or guaranty of any sort is made by G&E or the author. This information may not be applicable to your situation.

You are free to use this material if you agree with the terms and conditions under "Notices" or on the G&E web site, NOTICES, http://www.geEngineeringSystems.com Anyone who uses this material for any purpose does so at their own sole risk and you indemnify G&E and the authors entirely. If you do not agree, do not use this material.



Notices

Creative Commons Deed. You are welcome to use and expand on this information, provided you agree with the following Creative Commons Deed:

You are free:

- * to copy, distribute, display and perform the work
- * to make derivative works
- Under the following conditions:
- * Attribution. You must give the original author credit
- * Noncommercial. You may not use this work for commercial purposes
- * For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the license terms of this work

*Any of these conditions can be waived if you get permission from the author.

Your fair use and other rights are in no way affected by the above. This is a human-readable summary of the Legal Code (the full license): <u>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/legalcode</u>.

Limitations. The authors and G&E make no warranty or guaranty that any of the information in this report is suitable for any purpose. You are totally on your own if you use this information!! If you download any document, or use any information, you agree to indemnify G&E and the authors entirely. Do not download or use any document unless you agree with these limitations.



Agenda

- A Possible Future for ShakeMap Forecasting Power Outages - with David Wald of USGS
- SERA ShakeMap ShakeCast Pager
- Who Pays? CEC, NSF, USGS, Utility Contributions
- Questions and Comments



ShakeMap and ShakeCast

- ShakeMap gives you "near real time" ground motions after earthquakes
- ShakeCast reads in ShakeMaps, adds in inventory, and produces various forecasts
- What is the difference between SERA and ShakeCast?
- Can ShakeCast be updated to produce forecasts of power outages?

☆ USGS ENS

🔁 USGS ENS March 30, 2022 at 7:13 PM

2022-03-31 02:05:26 UPDATED: (M4.0) California-Nevada border region 37.4 -118.6 (8c4b7) To: Earthlink Eidinger, Reply-To: ens@ens.usgs.gov


M4.0 Earthquake - California-Nevada border region

Preliminary Report

Magnitude	4.0
Date-Time	31 Mar 2022 02:05:27 UTC 30 Mar 2022 19:05:27 near epicenter 30 Mar 2022 18:05:27 standard time in your timezone
Location	37.410N 118.606W
Depth	9 km
Distances	1.9 km (1.2 mi) WSW of Round Valley, California 115.0 km (71.3 mi) NE of Sanger, California 117.2 km (72.6 mi) ENE of Clovis, California 117.5 km (72.9 mi) NE of Reedley, California 219.6 km (136.1 mi) SSE of Carson City, Nevada
Location Uncertainty	Horizontal: 0.4 km; Vertical 1.0 km
Parameters	Nph = 23; Dmin = 7.4 km; Rmss = 0.06 seconds; Gp = 66° Version = 3
Event ID	nc 73712486 ***This event has been revised.




Earthquake Hazards Program



Mar respective men




Earthquake Hazards Program



Marshar and and a start of the start of the




Estimated Fatalities






Estimated Customers with Power Outages



Estimated Customers with Power Outages




OK, This is a Cool Tool

- Start with Earthquakes
- Extend to Winter Storms, Hurricanes, Fires, Heat Waves, Cold Snaps, Floods, Tornados
- Gives Emergency Response Panners, Public some really useful information
- Add a "what -if" capability, and it becomes a great planning tool for Utilities
- Educate the Regulators (CPUC, Boards of Directors, City Councils, etc.)

Can this be Reliable?

- SERA: Yes, If you put in a huge amount of inventory, fragility information, geohazards
- SERA: Yes, AND you calibrate, calibrate, calibrate over many earthquakes, many systems

SERA v 9.3 Capability



How does this Tool Work?

- Method 1. No inventory (say, North Carolina)
- Method 2. With inventory (say northern California)

Method 1

- Compute PGA, PGV, Spectra, PGD, etc.
- Create a default inventory base on population (Census Tract) and location (zones with 2022vintage seismic details, zones with limited seismic details, zones with no seismic details
- Use fragility models that are based on default inventory.
- Calibrate against west coast utilities

Method 2

- Compute PGA, PGV, Spectra, PGD, etc.
- Run SERA (inside ShakeMap)
- Issue results to utility owners (alerts, etc.)
- All this issues with who owns the data, access, etc. would need to be developed jointly with utilities who sign up.
- Conceptually, the same results as produced by SERA (damage by component, circuit reliability, maps, etc.)

Inventory, Fragility, Hazard

• SERA Model for a large electric utility

- > 10 GB of data
- > 2,000 fragility models
- > 100,000 lines of code

Who Needs this Tool?

- PG&E, SCE, SDG&E, BPA, BCH, PacifiCorp: "I got mine, it runs on my PC"
- LADWP, SCL, PGE, WAPA: I'm interested. Some University types took a crack at this. I perceive a lot of risk. I've done something already.
- TVA, MLG&W. Hmmm. I perceive some risk.
- Palo Alto, Silicon Valley Power, Alameda, Glendale. I'm too small to worry about this... I've got a utility to run.... I'll deal with it after the fact.


Who Needs this Tool?


- IID, SMUD, Turlock Irrigation District, Liberty Energy
- Burbank, Glendale, Pasadena, Anaheim
- 80 Small "mom and pops" in Oregon and Washington States
- And > 1,000 utilities in other seismic zones (Quebec, British Columbia, South Carolina, Illinois, Yukon, Hawaii, Alaska, etc.)
- Japan, New Zealand, Turkey, Taiwan, India, Italy, Greece, China, Indonesia, Chile, Peru.....

So, What are the Issues to Make This Happen?

- 1994 HAZUS. John and Dennis wrote the Electric Power Module. Free. Simple default inventory.
- 1999. Thalia Agnanos report on substation fragility.
- We have learned a lot since then!

HAZUS 1994 (Dennis and John)






Item	500 kV	230 kV	115 kV	β _c
	Median	Median	Median	
	(PGA, g)	(PGA, g)	(PGA, g)	
TR 500 kV Anchored	0.40	0.60	0.75	0.70
TR 500 kV Unanchored	0.25	0.30	0.50	0.70
CB Live Tank, Standard	0.30	0.50	0.60	0.70
CB Live Tank, Seismic	0.40	0.70	1.00	0.70
CB Dead Tank	0.70	1.60	2.00	0.70
DS - Rigid Bus	0.40	0.50	0.90	0.70
DS - Flex Bus	0.60	0.75	1.20	0.70
SA	0.40	0.60	1.00	0.70
CCVT - post supported	0.90	0.60	1.00	0.70
CCVT - suspended	0.30	0.60		0.70
CT - gasketed	0.30	0.50	0.75	0.70
CT - flanged	0.80			0.70
WT - post supported	0.50	0.60	1.00	0.70
WT - suspended	1.30	1.40	1.60	0.60

Table 5-2. HAZUS 500 kV I

Models

Thalia 1999 (HAZUS + Anshel)



Item	500 kV	230 kV	115 kV	β _c
	Median	Median	Median	, -
	(PGA, g)	(PGA, g)	(PGA, g)	
TR 500 kV Anchored	0.40	0.60	0.75	0.70
TR 500 kV Unanchored	0.25	0.30	0.50	0.70
CB Live Tank, Standard	0.30 0.27	0.50	0.60	0.70
CB Live Tank, Seismic	0.40	0.70	1.00	0.70
CB Dead Tank	0.70	1.60	2.00	0.70
DS - Rigid Bus	0.40	0.50	0.90	0.70
DS - Flex Bus	0.60	0.75	1.20	0.70
SA	0.40	0.60	1.00	0.70
CCVT - post supported	0.90	0.60	1.00	0.70
CCVT - suspended	0.30	0.60		0.70
CT - gasketed	0.30	0.50	0.75	0.70
CT - flanged	0.80			0.70
WT - post supported	0.50	0.60	1.00	0.70
WT - suspended	1.30	1.40	1.60	0.60

Table 5-2. HAZUS / Thalia Fragility Models

HAZUS + Agnanos

- What Did Dennis, John, Thalia, Anshel Miss in 1994 and 1999?
- We drew fragility models using RAW data.
- We did not distinguish between damage due to inertial motions and adverse bus interactions
- 2022: Today, we see that perhaps half of all past damage was due to adverse bus interactions
- 2022: Today, we see that the MAJORITY of power outages are due to damage in the Distribution System




Bus Issues Pardee Substation 1994 Northridge PGA = 0.56g

What is the Fragility Level for this 220 kVDS?




Bus Issues Pardee Substation 1994 Northridge PGA = 0.56g

What is the Fragility Level for this 220 kVDS?



What is the Fragility Level for this 220 kVDS?



Bus Issues Pardee Substation 1994 Northridge PGA = 0.56g


Row # / Component (all 220 kV)	Not Damaged	Damaged	Comment
1. Disconnect Switches (Horizontal)	79	56	41.4%
2. Potential Transformers	6	0	0%
3. CCVTs	26	19	42.2%
4. Circuit Breakers Dead Tank / SF6	45	0	0%
5. Circuit Breakers (all types) Live Tank	2	23	92%
6. Wave Traps	13	0	0%
7. GE ATB Live Tank Breaker	0	6	100%
8. Other Live Tank Breaker	5	4	44%
9. DS next to damaged GE ATB LT CB	1	11	91.7%
10. DS next to undamaged W SF6 CB	43	17	28.3%
11. DS next to swinging WT	7	11	61.1%
12. DS next to swinging CCVT	25	23	47.9%
13. DS not next to sides of damaged CB or swinging WT or swinging CCVT	57	12	17.3%
14. DS posts not next to damaged CB or swinging WT or swinging CCVT	125	13	9.4%
15. DS next to sides of damaged CB or swinging WT or swinging CCVT	10	23	69.7%
16. DS posts next to damaged CB or swinging WT or swinging CCVT	39	27	48.2%

Observed Damage Data, Pardee Substation


Component (all 220 kV)	Combined Inertial +	Inertial Only	Sample Size
	Interaction	Oilly	5120
	PGA, g	PGA, g	
1. DS, Horizontal Break, Flex Stand	0.598	0.831	135
2. Potential Transformers		0.917	6
3. CCVTs			45
4. CB Westinghouse Dead Tank / SF6		1.037	45
5. CB Live Tank	0.367		25
6. WT Hanging	1.008		13
7. CB GE ATB Live Tank	0.342		6
8. CB Other Live Tank Breaker	0.586		9

Fragility Models, Pardee Substation Beta = 0.30


Quantifying Bus Forces





Quantifying Bus Forces



Snapshot during Test









Conductor: Bluebird 2156 kcmil Steel core Aluminum strands



- Substations: We have "nearly solved" the seismic vulnerability. Some utilities are well on their way to implementation. Some utilities are like Dinosaurs.
- Distribution Systems: The Elephant on the room
- How much to complete the job? Brute force = \$300,000,000 for California.
- SERA and ShakeMaps: tools to quantify, evaluate, and make smart decisions. Maybe find a \$40 B mitigation plan that does 95% of the \$300 B brute force plan.



Key Findings

- Modern Seismic-Qualified Substations: a WHOLE LOT BETTER than what was built in the 1960s and 1970s
- Old, vulnerable equipment had Fragility levels PGA = 0.2g to 0.5g
- New, qualified equipment has Fragility levels commonly PGA = 1.3g+



Key Findings

- To Forecast outages, we need:
- Substation issues (0-25% of issue in California, 50%± in Memphis, Eugene, Salt Lake City)
- Distribution issues (75-100% of issue in California, 50±% in Memphis, Eugene, Salt Lake City)
- Power Plants, Grid Frequency: 2nd order
- Locally: Landslides (liquefaction) for Towers, Jumpers, etc.



Summary

- SERA ShakeMap. These tools can predict power outages. All you need is inventory, fragility, hazards.
- Substations. The problem is largely "solved".
 Some utilities implement. Others are waiting for that 66 million year event.
- \$300 Billion will reduce power outages by 90%. Maybe SERA - ShakeMap tools can do this "smarter".



Possible Actions

- USGS ShakeMap + SERA
- -1 man-year effort. Uncle Sam. Many will be involved.
- -20,000 lines of new code
- 6 months to get it working "Alpha"
- 3 months of calibration "Beta"
- Low data -> High uncertainty, Red, Yellow, Green Maps
- High data -> Increased confidence, better tool for planning



