## Power Outages in the Dec 20 2022 Ferndale Earthquake

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## Power Outages

- 70,000 customers immediately lose power
- Represents 100% of community that was exposed to PGA = 0.02g to 0.60g+
- < 5,000 customers lost power due to something physically breaking (wire down, etc.) (35 instances)
- >65,000 customers lost power due to phase-tophase or phase-to-ground faults

## Phase to Phase / Ground Faults

- Shaking causes towers / poles to vibrate, which in turn cause conductors to oscillate
- Nearly all circuits have 3 phases
- If wires swing out-of-sync and get too close to neighboring phase, the line "faults", a circuit breaker opens, and there is a power outage
- Statistical evaluations show that about 1 / 1000 spans (between two poles or towers) had phases that faulted. Faults occurred at PGA > 0.4g, and PGA < 0.05g

TABLE 42AP Number of Towers / Poles HAZARD RANGE	Number of Transmission Spans	Number of Faults
$PGA = 0.010 \text{ to } 0.049 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.050 \text{ to } 0.099 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.100 \text{ to } 0.149 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.150 \text{ to } 0.199 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.200 \text{ to } 0.249 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.250 \text{ to } 0.299 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.300 \text{ to } 0.349 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.350 \text{ to } 0.399 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.400 \text{ to } 0.449 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.450 \text{ to } 0.499 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.550 \text{ to } 0.599 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.550 \text{ to } 0.599 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.600 \text{ to } 0.590 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.600 \text{ to } 0.590 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.600 \text{ to } 0.590 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.600 \text{ to } 0.590 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.600 \text{ to } 0.590 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.600 \text{ to } 0.590 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.600 \text{ to } 0.590 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.600 \text{ to } 0.590 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.600 \text{ to } 0.500 \text{ to } 0.590 \text{ g} \\ PGA = 0.600 \text{ to } 0.500 $	4174 1530 527 383 255 480 136 95 53 71 56 33	2
10A = 01000 c0 01049 g	1/	





Test S18. IEEE 693 Qualification Spectra (3D) Bluebird Conductor. Large slack (T-line). Tight Slack (Substation).



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![](_page_8_Picture_0.jpeg)

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## Conclusions

- 95% of power outages in M 6.4 Fortuna / Ferndale Earthquake were due to faults in the transmisson network
- Forecasting the phase-to-phase movement of power cables requires modest to high shaking coupled with out-of-sync conductor movements (about 2 to 3 sigma events). About 1 in 1,000 spans fault. This is RARE, but there are many thousands of exposed spans. 6 faults out of 7,000+ spans.
- To eliminate 95% of outages requires mitigation of the overhead conductors. We need long period ground time histories that account for basin effects and spatial time delay; plus structural models.