

# Puebla M 7.1 Earthquake of Sept 19 2017 Impact to Water and Power

John Eiding, Bruce Maison  
[eiding@geEngineeringSystems.com](mailto:eiding@geEngineeringSystems.com)  
[maison@netscape.com](mailto:maison@netscape.com)

Updated 9.14.2018



# The TCLEE Team

- The Council of Lifeline Earthquake Engineering
- The TCLEE Investigation Team:
  - Alexis Kwasinski ([akwasins@pitt.edu](mailto:akwasins@pitt.edu))
  - Alex Tang ([alexktang@mac.com](mailto:alexktang@mac.com))
  - Bruce Maison ([maison@netscape.com](mailto:maison@netscape.com))
  - John Eidinge ([eidinge@geEngineeringSystems.com](mailto:eidinge@geEngineeringSystems.com))
  - Haizhong Wang ([Haizhong.Wang@oregonstate.edu](mailto:Haizhong.Wang@oregonstate.edu))
- Document (TCLEE #3) at [www.geEngineeringSystems.com](http://www.geEngineeringSystems.com) (free).



# Acknowledgements

- The Utilities in Mexico: CFE (Electricity); La Comision Nacional del Aqua CONAGUA, SACMEX, CAEM (Water). Many, many people and thanks to all!
- The Professors and Engineers in Mexico:
  - UNAM, Mario Rodriguez Rodriguez ([mrod@unam.mx](mailto:mrod@unam.mx))
  - Raul Flores Berrones ([rflores@tlaloc.imta.mx](mailto:rflores@tlaloc.imta.mx))
  - Gustavo Ayala Milian ([GAyalaM@iingen.unam.mx](mailto:GAyalaM@iingen.unam.mx))
- Prof. Mike O'Rourke ([orourm@rpi.edu](mailto:orourm@rpi.edu))



# Key points

- Water System: 1,500 Pipe Repairs. Aqueduct Failures. Basin Effect issue. No seismic design.
- Power System: 37 damaged substations. 4.78 million people lose power. “Limited” seismic design.
- Codes and Standards:
  - ALA (2005) will solve most water pipe seismic design issues (should be updated for basin effects). [www.americanlifelinesalliance.com](http://www.americanlifelinesalliance.com), [www.geEngineeringSystems.com](http://www.geEngineeringSystems.com) (free)
  - IEEE 693 (2018) will solve most substation issues (including cable slack issues). <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org> (fee)
- Remaining implementation time for California: Water: 50 years. Power: 10 years.



# CFE

## Commmision Federal de Electricidad

### “la comision”

- CFE is the power transmission company for all of Mexico.
- Transmission voltages are 400 kV, 230 kV





# LAGUNA SALADA M 7.1 2010


Interconnected with SDG&E

## RECENT MAJOR EARTHQUAKES

### Transmission Grid



Detail of metropolitan Mexico City



#### Symbology

- Generation Station
- Wind Station
- Photovoltaic Station
- Substation
- 400 kV Line
- 400 kV Future Line
- 230 kV Line
- 230 kV Power Cable
- 161 - 138 kV Line
- 115 - 69 kV Line
- 115 kV Power Cable
- 34.5 kV Line
- 34.5 kV Power Cable

Manzanillo

COLIMA M 7.5 2003

MIHOACAN M 8.5 1985

CHIAPAS M 8.2 2017

PUEBLA M 7.1 2017

# Chiapas M 8.2 (Sept 7 2017)

- Shaking level: PGA ~ 0.5g±.
- Near the Pacific coast, so seismic design for newer equipment (PGA = 0.5g).
- Juchitan Dos (Toppled 230 kV transformer, broken 230 kV CT, broken 230 kV CB, 230 kV DS)
- Ixtepec, Matias Romero, Oaxaca Substations
- Total Damage ~ \$126 million pesos (~\$7 Million USD)



# Puebla M 7.1 Sept 19 2017

- Intraplate. Inland, ~100 km SE of Mexico City, ~70 km SW of Puebla.
- 37 substations with damage.
- 6 Transmission steel lattice towers with damage.
- 1 High voltage cable with damage.
- Moderate or Low shaking (PGA ~ 0.08g to 0.25g at the damaged substations)






# M 7.1 Puebla Earthquake

- Sept 19. Power outages: Peak at 4.78 million customers, over 7 states. ~35% of all CFE customers lost power in Central Mexico, at least temporarily.
- Sept 20. Power outages: 95% restored.
- Sept 23. Power outages: 99% restored.
- Restoration effort: 3,072 CFE workers. Distribution: 74 portable generators, 1 helicopter, 920 trucks, 468 cranes.
- Transmission: widespread equipment failures at 1 substation (400 kV), some equipment failures (400 kV and 230 kV) at 6 substations (400 kV and 230 kV)



Note: damage (mostly minor) to 29 additional lower voltage substations not shown in this schematic



YTP 400 kV Substation  
PGA = 0.15 to 0.2g±



Photo Credit: Google Maps (2018)




SHAKEMAP EARTHQUAKE  
ID= us2000ar20  
Magnitude = 7.10  
Factored by 1.00  
PGA-g

0.70 +	Red
0.55 - 0.70	Blue
0.40 - 0.55	Green
0.25 - 0.40	Magenta
0.20 - 0.25	Black
0.15 - 0.20	Cyan
0.10 - 0.15	Yellow
0.05 - 0.10	Grey






YTP


PGA 0.15g - 0.20g  
± 50%






 Item Damaged by Earthquake - Replaced

# Damage at YTP (Most Heavily Damaged Substation)

	Circuit Breaker
	Disconnect Switch
	Wave Trap
	Surge Arrester
	CCVT



	Transformer
	Pot Head
	Connection





400 kV Transformers (11) (4 x 400-115; 7 x 400-230)

All unanchored

1 slid ~7 inches

1 slid ~2 inches

9 showed ~0 to 1 inch sliding

Many control cables deformed, none reported damaged





sliding



7 Inches of sliding







Control Cables Deformed due to Sliding



4 x 400 - 115 kV Transformers



Broken 400 kV Surge Arrestor

Broken 400 kV bushing






400 kV Bushings (1 / 10 with damage)





400 kV TR Bushing





Low Voltage  
TR Bushing





400 kV TR Bushing







LV kV Bushings (1 / 14 with damage)








**OHIO BRASS**  
SURGE ARRESTER  
STATION  
KV RMS  
KV LINE  
KV MO  
TYPE  
BODY  
VOLTAGE  
RATING  
PRESS  
REC'D  
SER. NO.  
A. J. W. MOORE  
MURBELL THE OHIO BRASS CO.  
CINCINNATI, OHIO, U.S.A.





CB

PI

DS

Older 230 kV DS (Scissor Switch) (6) - 3 / 6 collapsed





230 kV  
Scissor Switch





230 kV CBs 3 / 6 collapsed. May have been aggravated by collapse of adjacent Scissor Switches, note the tight slack





DS

CB

CT

Newer 400 kV CB (12) - 0 / 12 damaged  
Newer 400 kV DS (30) - 0 / 30 damaged  
Newer 400 kV CT (12) - 0 / 12 damaged





The Bone Yard



400 kV CB



Seismic "Qualified" for PGA = 0.2g



400 kV CB







400 kV  
Surge  
Arrestor



400 kV  
Wave Trap





230 kV CB


400 kV CT  
Older

400 kV CT  
Newer



400 kV CT  
Failure is non-ductile failure of  
cast aluminum bracket.  
Likely due to insufficient slack







400 kV CT  
Non-ductile failure of  
cast aluminum bracket.  
Likely due to insufficient slack



400 kV CT  
Non-ductile failure of  
cast aluminum bracket.  
Likely due to insufficient slack



400 kV CB  
Newer  
12 / 12 no damage





Older 400 kV CT  
3 failures

Older 400 kV CB  
19 / 36 failures

Replacements



400 kV CB

60 Hz

2000 Amps

W = 3200 Kg (per pole)

Fabricated December 2000

Seismic Qualification = 0.20g









Control Building





Batteries

No seismic design!  
(how can this be?)

Rocking starts at  $PGA > 0.1g$ .

1 cell toppled.

Remaining cells  
manually moved.

Evidence suggests  
that  $PGA$  was likely  $< 0.3g$ .

Damage to Mexico City's Water System  
(King of Broken Segmented Large  
Diameter Concrete Pipes)





# Historical Earthquakes

Year	M	Water System Damage
1818 May 31		Broken arches in aqueducts in Mexico City
1820 May 4		Damage to above ground aqueducts in Mexico City
1835 Jan 6		Damage to above ground aqueducts in Mexico City
1864 Oct 3		Damage to buried clay pipes in Mexico City
1882 July 19		Damage to buried clay pipes in Mexico City
1907 April 14	8.2	Damage to buried clay pipes in Mexico City
1932 June 3	8.4	Extensive damage to buried pipelines in Mexico City
1973 June 30	7.5	Damage to buried main aqueducts (20 locations) in Orizaba and Cordoba (Orizaba EQ)
1979 March 14	7.6	Damage to a buried aqueduct in Mexico City (Guerrero EQ)
1985 Sept 19	8.1	Extensive damage to buried pipelines and buried aqueducts in Mexico City (Mihoacan EQ)
2017 Sept 17	7.1	More damage to aqueducts in Mexico City (Puebla EQ)



# M 7.1 Puebla Earthquake (Sept 19 2017)

- 1,500 leaks
- Tlahuac - Mixqui - Santa Catarina
  - 48" diameter segmented concrete pipe
  - 26 leaks in 22 kilometers
  - Why? Answer: Not related to PGD, Yes, related to PGV, but mostly related to Basin effects (how to select "c")
  - ALA (2005):  $7 * V/c$  might not be enough for basin effects. "7" might need to be increased to about 15 for  $PGV = 25$  inches / second (median) in basin-effect zones; or segmented pipes not allowed in zones subject to basin effects; or site-specific design required.
  - $V/c$  is NEVER recommended for segmented pipes.





Es conveniente señalar que en las redes de distribución de agua potable se han presentado más de mil 500 fugas.



Es conveniente señalar que en las redes de distribución de agua potable se han presentado más de mil 500 fugas.

## Bar Wrap Pipe Leak





Santa Catarina

48" diameter

26 leaks in 22 km



Replaced 192 meters of pipe that were so badly damaged that they could not be quickly repaired

Photo Credit: Conaqua


## Distribution of Potable Water System

more than 1,500 leaks had been found in the distribution network

besides the east of the Iztapalapa delegacion and a part of the delegation Tlahuac, in the City of Mexico



# Lock Joint Reinforced Concrete Pipe




LONGITUDINAL SECTION

Lock Joint Pipe Company, New York  
Manufactured Locally Near the Job Site


Pressure pipes, 8-inches to 108-inches







Capacity ~ 1.0 inches



# Lock Joint Reinforced Concrete Pipe



45 to 95 feet head, 48-inch and 66-inch pipe being manufactured




# Why do segmented pipes break in shaking?

- S Waves (vertically propagating shear waves) or R Waves (horizontally propagating surface waves) ?
- S waves are the historically commonly accepted phenomena. Remains valid in soil zones located away from mountains
- Slow moving waves are becoming more recognized. Pulses, Directivity. Basin Effects.
  - Basins in California (Los Angeles, Pasadena, etc.) can be exposed to significant Basin effects




Case	Pipe M (kip-inch)	Joint Force (kips)	Joint opening (inch)
A	1260	~0	0 (restrained)
B	2980	2,040	1.35" peak

Case A




S Wave

Case B



R Wave





Case B  
R Wave

Joint Opening Capacity ~ 1.0 inches

Case B Variations:

Increase surface wave speed to 10,000 feet/sec. Result: joint opening 0.29 inches

Increase surface wave speed to 20,000 feet/sec. Result: joint opening 0.16 inches



# Observations

- Joints will open when there is a single pre-cracked joint after a long reach of continuous pipes
- Joints will open if there are slow moving travelling waves.
- Joints will open if there is a major stiffness discontinuity (vault, elbow) viz.
- Basin effects, pulses, directivity all make this worse




# What to do?

- No segmented critical pipe. Solves the issue.
- Chained ductile iron pipe (eg. Kubota, US Pipe, etc.). Solves the issue.
- Continuous pipe (eg. welded steel, HDPE, etc.) Solves the issue.
- Long throw joints (6"+) can solve the issue.



# Distribution Repairs



Instrumental Recordings in Mexico City

- Ground Motions. Mexico City “rock”. PGA = 0.05 to 0.10g. PGV = 10 cm / second. (1/5 of inventory)
- Ground Motions. Mexico City “lake and transition”. PGA = 0.07 to 0.2g, PGV = 28 cm / second. (4/5 of inventory)
- About 20,000 km of pipe (all types)
- Very few PGD zones (handfull, perhaps dozens of repairs)
- $RR = k_I * 0.00187 * PGV$  (RR in repairs / 1000 feet, PGV in inches / second,  $k_I$  varies based on pipe type) (see ALA 2001, Eidinger, Maison et al, for derivation of this pipe damage model)



# Distribution Repairs

- Total pipeline inventory might be about 20,000 km for 22 million people.  
“average” PGV = 24.5 cm/sec = 9.6 inch/sec
- Forecast repairs =  $0.00187 * 9.6 * (20,000 * 3.30)$  (assuming  $k_I = 1.0$ )
- Forecast repairs ~ 1,185
- Actual repairs ~ 1,500
- Pipeline inventory is known to have severe leakage (pre-earthquake losses ~30% or more), is aged, much might be in hot soils, PGV might be > 24.5 cm/sec for oldest and weakest pipes, many pipes have undergone distortions due to 1 to 3 inches of subsidence per year over 100 year time frame, length of pipe might be more or less than 20,000 km.
- Considering these issues, the first-order prediction (1,185), with further adjustments, might be within ballpark of actual (1,500). Or, Mexico  $k = 1.27$ .



# Questions

